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ABSTRACT 
Ferguson, Missouri is everywhere. This has been an enduring and sad lesson in the year since 
Michael Brown was killed. The national spotlight has moved throughout cities and towns across the 
United States, as unarmed Black men, women and children have been killed by police officers at an 
exhausting pace. Mr. Brown’s death has caused stakeholders to grasp and examine the similarities 
between the wide range of issues impacting Ferguson’s Black communities and their respective 
communities. Thus, the events in Ferguson have been the source of reflection, examination and action. In 
that spirit, this essay looks at some similarities between Ferguson and Baltimore, which have grown 
despairingly closer in light of Freddie Gray’s death in April, 2015. Specifically, the essay explores the 
vast capacities of the criminal justice systems in these two cities to police and prosecute communities of 
color, particularly for low-level crimes that flood the criminal court dockets in both jurisdictions. It then 
focuses on ways in which poor, Black residents in Ferguson and Baltimore remain stuck in the criminal 
justice system because of court-issued warrants.  
INTRODUCTION 
The killing of Michael Brown and the aftermath of this tragedy in Ferguson continue to resonate 
throughout the United States and even internationally, particularly as police killings of unarmed men, 
women, and children of color have continued with frightening regularity in the short time since his death. 
Within the U.S., many have described and examined parallels between Ferguson and their own small 
towns, cities and neighborhoods that are majority Black and Latino. The relationships in these 
communities between law enforcement officers and the residents they have sworn to serve and protect are 
often intense, disconnected and antagonistic. These are communities that, as many have articulated, have 
dire need and demand for law enforcement, but not the type of law enforcement that stereotypes, 
generalizes, disrespects, interferes with without reason, harms and kills.1 The string of killings that 
followed Michael Brown in cities such as Staten Island, Cleveland, Brooklyn, North Charleston, and 
Baltimore and their after-effects have brought national focus to police-citizen encounters and have also 
raised desperate, crushingly sad concerns about the value of Black lives. 
Thus, Ferguson lit a fuse that has ignited conversations, debates, passions, demonstrations, 
marches, advocacy, investigations, lawsuits and some reforms related to law enforcement, public safety 
and criminal justice. Many local, state and national stakeholders have taken lessons from Ferguson and 
beyond to call for measures to enhance law enforcement transparency, accountability and public trust 
Such measures include proposals for officers to wear body cameras, receive training on unconscious 
biases and reside in the cities and neighborhoods they patrol.2 
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1 See Charles Blow, A Kaffeklatsch on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2015, at A17 (“Minority communities want 
policing the same as any other, but they want it to be appropriate and proportional.”). 
2 For instance, the San Francisco Public Defender Office formed a Racial Justice Committte to make 
recommendations regarding policing in communities of color. The committee’s ten recommendations include that 
officers receive at least twenty-four hours of training on implicit bias, annual performance evaluations that look at, 
inter alia, “documented history of racial bias excessive force, [and] unlawful search and seizure and false reports, 
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 Some proposals are much broader. In December, 2014, President Obama signed an executive 
order that established the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.3 He created the Task Force to 
“strengthen community policing and trust among law enforcement officers and the communities they 
serve—especicially in light of recent events around the country that have underscored the need for and 
importance of lasting collaborative relationships between local police and the public.”4 He charged the 
Task Force with proposing a set of recommendations for best law enforcement practices.  
To meet the President’s charge, the Task Force hosted listening sessions across the United States 
on issues related to policing and the criminal justice system. The Task Force then provided President 
Obama an expansive set of recommendations and action items for law enforcement and criminal justice 
reform.5 These recommendations and action items include, among many others, “review and evaluate all 
components of the criminal justice system”;6 “establish a culture of transparency and accountability 
[among law enforcement agencies] in order to build trust and legitimacy”;7 “initiat[e] positive 
nonenforcment activities to engage communities . . . [with] high rates of investigative and enforcement 
involvement with government agencies”;8 consider and review policies regarding law enforcement 
techniques against “vulnerable populations—including children, eldery persons, pregnant women, people 
with physical and mental disabilities, limited English proficiency, and others”;9 diversify police officer 
ranks (“including race, gender, language, life experience, and cultural background”);10 build relationships 
with immigrant communities;11 collaborate with communities to develop crime-reduction and trust-
enchancing strategies in communities and neighborhoods “disproportionately affected by crime”;12 
develop publicly available use of force policies that include “training, investigations, prosecutions, data 
collection and information sharing”;13 use of force training that “emphasize[s] de-escalation and 
alternatives to arrest or summons in situations where appropriate”;14 develop best practices that eliminate 
bias from eyewitness identification procedures;15 “collect, maintain and analyze demographic data on all 
detentions (stops, frisks, searches, summons, and arrests) . . . disaggregated by school and non-school 
contacts”;16 establish “some form of civilian oversight” of law enforcement, with input from every 
community; 17 “refrain from practices requiring officers to issue a predetermined number of tickets, 
citations, arrests, or summonses”;18 adopt policies that prohibit “profiling and discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, age, gender, gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
providing financial incentives for officers to live in the communities they patrol, appointing a youth representive to 
the San Francisco Police Commission and “not detain, search or arrest children at school in the absence of an 
imminent threat of danger.” SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER, RACIAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE PLAN FOR POLICE 
REFORM (2015), http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/Police-Reform-Plan.pdf. 
3 Executive Order, Establishment of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, December 18, 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/executive-order-establishment-presidents-task-force-21st-
century-policin. 
4 FINAL REP’T OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, at iii (May 2015) 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter 21ST CENTURY POLICING REP’T]. 
5 See generally id. 
6 0.1 Overarching Recommendation, id. at 7.  
7 1.3 Recommendation, id. at 12. 
8 1.5. Recommendation, id at 14.  
9 1.5.4 Action Item, id. at 15-16. 
10 1.8 Recommendation, id. at 16. 
11 1.9 Recommendation, id. at 18. 
12 2.1 Recommendation, id. at 20. 
13 2.2 Recommendation, id. 
14 2.2.1 Action Item, id. 
15 2.4 Recommendation, id. at 23. 
16 2.6 Recommendation, id. at 24. 
17 2.8 Recommendation, id. at 26. 
18 2.9 Recommendation, id.  
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immigration status, disability, housing status, occupation, or language fluency”;19 “infuse [community 
policing] . . . throughout the culture and organizational structure of law enforcement agencies”;20 work 
with public schools “to encourage the creation of alternatives to student suspensions and expulsion”;21 
“affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision making”; 22 “implement ongoing, top-
down training for all officers in cultural diversity”;23 and “study mental health issues unique to 
officers.”24  
While these recommendations are thorough and desperately needed, they of course do not address 
all of the issues that impact cities such as Ferguson. The events that occurred there are not solely about 
the killing of Michael Brown, law enforcement practices and police-citizen relations. The encounter 
between Officer Darren Wilson and Mr. Brown was not an isolated circumstance devoid of context. The 
tragedy and the anger, hurt and desperation that followed took place in a segregated town, where the seats 
of power are disconnected from the majority of residents in every way imaginable and where the criminal 
justice system wears on Black, poor residents with unbearable weight and singular fury.   
 The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has detailed the 
myriad ways in which the entirety of Ferguson’s criminal justice system marginalizes, trivializes and 
criminalizes Black lives.25 The DOJ opened an investigation into Ferguson’s Police Department and 
municipal court system because of the events surrounding and following Mr. Brown’s death. The 
investigation revealed countless accounts of and insights into the ways in which Black residents were 
abused by law enforcement officers, arrested for trivial offenses or even no offenses at all, prosecuted en 
masse in municipal court and then remained embedded in the criminal justice system because of their 
inability to pay the wild array of fines and court fees that attached to their offenses as well as to their 
participation in the court process.26 The DOJ concluded that at each stage of the criminal justice system, 
Black residents suffered unbearably and unconstitutionally.27 Specifically, it found that Ferguson’s Police 
Department engaged in patterns of Fourth Amendment violations stemming from unconstitutional stops, 
arrests and excessive force,28 as well as First Amendment violations stemming from arresting and 
punishing individuals for engaging in “a variety of protected conduct: people are punished for talking 
back to officers, recording public police activities and lawfully protesting perceived injustices.”29 It also 
found Ferguson’s municipal court to be disorganized and non-transparent; that it imposes “substantial and 
unnecessary barriers” to challenge or resolve municipal code violations, is overly punitive and places 
undue hardships on individuals charged with code violations.30 The DOJ concluded that Ferguson’s law 
enforcement practices disproportionately harm Ferguson’s Black residents and are partly the product of 
racial bias.31 It also concluded that the unlawful police and court practices it detailed have eroded 
community trust in law enforcement and the criminal justice system and, thus, undermine public safety.32 
                                                          
19 2.13 Recommendation, id. at 28. 
20 4.2 Recommendation, id. at 43. 
21 4.6.2 Action Item, id. at 48. 
22 4.7 Recommendation, id. at 49.  
23 5.9.1 Action item, id. at 58. 
24 6.1.2 Action item, id at 63. 
25 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 
(2014) [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION]. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 78. 
28 Id. at 16–24, 28–41. 
29 Id. at 24; see id. 24–28 (discussing the First Amendment violations). 
30 Id. at 42–62. 
31 Id. at 62–78. 
32 Id. at 79–89. 
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Ferguson’s law enforcement practices and court system are abhorrent and in shambles. There is 
much work to do in Ferguson. But there is much work to do everywhere. Ferguson is by no means alone 
in the ways in which Black lives are marginalized on the streets and in the courts. I have worked on 
criminal justice issues in Baltimore for the past thirteen years. As it has with many others across the 
country, the events in Ferguson have caused me to examine ways in which some underlying issues in 
Ferguson align with issues and undercurrents in Baltimore. This essay will draw some of these 
similarities.  
The first part of this essay focuses on the ways in which poor, Black residents are entrenched in 
Ferguson’s and Baltimore’s criminal justice systems, in large measure because of the relatively minor 
offenses that flood lower courts. The second part looks at some ways in which these residents remain 
stuck in the criminal justice system through warrants that courts issue when they do not appear in court 
for docket calls. To use an often repeated phrase, out of tragedy comes hope. In that spirit, the third part 
briefly discusses some reform measures or ideas that have stemmed from Michael Brown’s death. The 
essay draws some potential lessons from these reforms.   
I. THE TELLING OF TWO CITIES—DEMOGRAPHICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 Aside from their sizes, Ferguson and Baltimore are remarkably similar demographically. 
Ferguson is a city-suburb that is part of the Greater St. Louis metropolitan area. It is home to 
approximately 21,000 residents, sixty-seven percent of whom are Black and nearly twenty-nine percent of 
whom are White.33 It is a hardscrabble town, as 24.9% of Ferguson’s residents live below the poverty 
line34 and approximately sixty-eight percent of the schoolchildren qualify for free or reduced lunch.35 
These demographics, however, are not represented in Ferguson’s seats of authority and power. 
Pathetically, only four out of fifty-four police officers in Ferguson are Black.36 Ferguson’s mayor is 
White, as are six of the school board’s seven members.37 At the time of Michael Brown’s death five of 
Ferguson’s six city council members were White.38 
Baltimore, by contrast, is a major city. It is the largest in Maryland, home to approximately 
620,000 residents, sixty-three percent of whom are black and 31.6% of whom are white.39 Grinding 
poverty and all that it brings is not hard to miss in many parts of the city, which has been studied, serviced 
and chronicled by researchers, agencies, service providers, journalists, filmmakers and television writers. 
                                                          
33 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERGUSON (CITY), MISSOURI, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2923986.html.  
34 Id. 
35 See Jessica Bock, Ferguson-Florissant, Riverview Gardens, Among Schools Offering Free Lunches to All 
Students, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/ferguson-
florissant-riverview-gardens-among-schools-offering-free-lunches-to/article_c92d264b-4c18-5e8a-9ab7-
1564e77c21f2.html (approximately sixty-eight percent of children in Ferguson-Florissant school district received 
free or reduced lunch in the 2013–2014 school year). 
36 DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 25, at 7. At the time of Michael Brown’s death Ferguson’s Police Department 
had fifty-three officers, three of whom were Black. Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know About Ferguson’s Police 
Department, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14/ferguson-
police-department-details/14064451/. 
37 German Lopez, Why Ferguson’s Government is So White, VOX, Aug. 14, 2014, 
http://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/6003793/why-is-fergusons-local-government-so-white/in/5757650. 
38 Id. Ferguson’s City Council is now fifty percent Black, the result of city council elections in April, 2015, that 
brought two Black councilmembers into office. Stephen Deere, High Vote Turnout in Ferguson Adds Two Black 
Council Members, for Three Total, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 2015, 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/high-voter-turnout-in-ferguson-adds-two-black-council-
members/article_422cb33f-c172-53de-a0c8-29386630ec72.html.  
39 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 33. 
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Approximately one quarter of Baltimore’s population lives below the poverty line40 and the 
overwhelming majority of schoolchildren—eighty-four percent— in Baltimore’s public schools are 
enrolled in a free or reduced lunch program.41 Unlike in Ferguson, Baltimore’s elected officials and 
police force are representative of Baltimore’s racial demographics.  
 As is true in towns and cities across the United States, entry into the criminal justice system is 
extraordinarily easy for Ferguson’s poor, Black residents. If they do not find the criminal justice system, 
often the criminal justice system finds them. Zero tolerance policies and a particular focus on driving 
offenses have flooded Ferguson’s traffic and criminal courts. As in other jurisdictions, these policies have 
allowed Ferguson’s police officers to stop, question, arrest and detain Black residents in large numbers.42 
Symptomatic of Ferguson’s reflexive use of its criminal justice system was the wholesale arrest approach 
on display during the protests that followed Mr. Brown’s killing. Many individuals who were speaking, 
videotaping, or standing in silence, including news reporters and photographers, were arrested and then 
released without being charged and without any paperwork—a practice known there as “catch and 
release.”43 
 These law enforcement practices in Ferguson infiltrate its municipal court system, where Black 
residents are prosecuted in extraordinarily disproportionate numbers and, literally, en masse.44 From 2012 
to 2014, Blacks constituted ninety-three percent of the arrests and ninety percent of the citations issued in 
Ferguson.45 Given these percentages, it is not surprising that Blacks constituted the overwhelming 
majority of individuals charged with particular crimes. Nonetheless, the numbers are jarring. During this 
same two year time period, Blacks totaled ninety-five percent of individuals charged with “manner of 
walking,” ninety-four percent of individuals charged with failure to comply, ninety-two percent of 
individuals charged with resisting arrest, ninety-two percent of individuals charged with peace 
disturbance and eighty-nine percent of individuals charged with failure to obey.46 In addition, Blacks 
were substantially more likely to leave municipal court with a conviction record, as they were sixty-eight 
percent less likely to have their charges dismissed.47 
 As in Ferguson, relationships between Baltimore’s police force and its Black residents have been 
disconnected, strained and, at times, violent. Unlike in Ferguson, Baltimore’s police force is 
                                                          
40 Id. (23.8% of persons in Baltimore lived below the poverty line from 2009 to 2013). 
41 MARYLAND STATE DEP’T OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY NUTRITION PROGRAMS, SCHOOL YEAR 
2014–2015 (STATEWIDE SUMMARY) (2014).  
42 For instance, Ferguson’s Police Department conducted 5,384 traffic stops in 2013—4,632 of which were of Black 
drivers. CHRIS KOSTER, VEHICLE STOPS REPORT (2013), http://ago.mo.gov/divisions/litigation/vehicle-stops-
report?lea=161. During these stops Black drivers were twice as likely as Whites to be searched, given a citation or 
arrested even though they were “26% less likely to have contraband found on them during the search.” DOJ 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 25 at 4, 62, 65. 
43 See Wesley Lowery, In Ferguson, Washington Post Reporter Wesley Lowery Gives Account of His Arrest, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-ferguson-washington-post-reporter-wesley-
lowery-gives-account-of-his-arrest/2014/08/13/0fe25c0e-2359-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html.   
44 Ferguson’s municipal court holds “three or four sessions per month, and each session lasts no more than three 
hours.” DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 25, at 9. Moreover:  
It is not uncommon for as many as 500 people to appear before the court in a single 
session,exceeding the court’s physical capacity and leading individuals to line up outside of court 
waiting to be heard. Many people have multiple offenses pending; accordingly, the court typically 
considers 1,200-1,500 offenses in a single session and has in the past considered over 2,000 
offenses during one session.  
Id.  
45 Id. at 62. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
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representative of the city’s racial demographics, although, as of 2013, more than seventy percent of 
Baltimore’s officers lived outside of the city.48 In Ferguson’s wake came the disclosure by the Baltimore 
Sun that from 2011 until the Sun’s investigative report in October of 2014, Baltimore had paid $5.7 
million in court judgments and settlements of over 100 police brutality and false arrest lawsuits.49 Some 
settlements involved the same police officers, who remained on the force despite multiple instances of 
substantiated abuse.50 In almost all of the criminal cases that followed the violent arrests, “prosecutors or 
judges dismissed the charges against the victims—if charges were filed at all.”51 Overall, from 2011 to 
the present—which includes the several months since October, 2014—Baltimore has paid approximately 
$6.3 million to resolve these lawsuits.52 
  Also as in Ferguson, Baltimore’s criminal justice system bears down disproportionately on its 
Black residents, particularly for low-level criminal offenses. Baltimore officially adopted zero tolerance 
policing in 2000.53 By 2005, the number of arrests jumped to over 100,000, approximately 76,500 of 
which were warrantless.54 The Office of the State’s Attorney took issue with these mass arrests for minor 
crimes and did not file charges in approximately one-third of the cases that originated with warrantless 
arrests.55 This process of bringing individuals into the criminal justice system is similar to Ferguson’s 
“catch and release” system that it utilized during the protests. However, in Baltimore this law 
enforcement approach has long been pervasive, so much so that it is referred to formally as an “arrest 
without charge” and known colloquially as a “walkthrough.” Through this mechanism, police officers 
arrest individuals, put them through the booking process, detain them in cramped, dirty cells and 
                                                          
48 Mark Puente, Some Baltimore Police Officers Face Repeated Misconduct Lawsuits, BALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 2014, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-police-repeaters-20141004-
story.html#page=1. This disconnection in Baltimore and elsewhere breeds misunderstanding and mistrust between 
departments and communities, as it does in other cities where most officers live outside of the communities they 
patrol.  This issue did not go unnoticed by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The Task Force 
recommended that “[l]aw enforcement agencies . . . institute residency incentive programs such as Resident Officer 
Programs,” so that officers live in the neighborhoods they patrol and protect. 21st CENTURY POLICING REP’T, Action 
Item 1.5.2, supra note 4, at at 15.  
49 Mark Puente, Undue Force, BALT. SUN, Sept. 28, 2014, http://data.baltimoresun.com/news/police-settlements/. 
Issues involving violent encounters between law enforcement and Maryland’s Black residents is not confined to 
Baltimore, just has issues uncovered in Ferguson are not confined to that town bur rather are symptomatic of larger 
issues in St. Louis County. E.g, Ryan J. Reilly & Mariah Stewart, Fleece Force: How Police and Courts Around 
Ferguson Bully Residents and Collect Millions, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/26/st-louis-county-municipal-courts_n_6896550.html (describing ways that 
several municipalities in St. Louis County impose fines, collect revenue and criminalize residents). The ACLU of 
Maryland estimates that between 2010 and 2014, “at least” 109 individuals in Maryland died in police custody. 
Seventy five of the individuals who died were Black, thirty-six of whom were unarmed. ACLU OF MARYLAND, 
BRIEFING PAPER ON DEATHS IN POLICE ENCOUNTERS IN MARYLAND, 2010-2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.aclu-
md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0623/md_deaths_police_encounters.pdf. 
50 Puente, supra note 48. 
51 Puente, supra note 49. 
52 Mark Puente & Doug Donovan, Brutality Lawsuits Continue in Baltimore, Site of Freddie Gray Death, BALT. 
SUN, Apr. 22, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-gray-police-lawsuits-
20150422-story.html#page=1. 
53 ANTHONY W. BATTS, POLICE COMMISSIONER, BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, “PREVENTING HARM”: 
CONDUCT IN THE COMMUNITY, Oct. 14, 2014.  
54 Amended Complaint, Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches, et al., v. Baltimore City Police 
Department, et al., Case No. 06-1863(CCB) 46–47, ¶ 264, http://www.aclu-md.org/uploaded-
files/0000/0205/amendedcomplaint.pdf [hereinafter Amended Complaint].  
55 See Reed Collins, Note, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New Crime in Baltimore, 
14 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419, 420 (2007); Justin Fenton, With Fewer Arrests in Baltimore, Fewer Cases that 
Don’t Stick, BALT. SUN (July 5, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-07-03/news/bs-md-ci-released-
without-charges-20110703_1_fewer-arrests-drug-dealers-fewer-cases. 
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eventually release them from central booking. They are not formally charged and do not see a judge. This 
practice has been centralized in Baltimore City, to the relative exclusion of the rest of Maryland, and used 
overwhelming against Black residents, young and old. In 2007, the Maryland State Conference of 
NAACP Branches, the Baltimore City Branch of the NAACP and several individuals filed suit against the 
Baltimore City Police Department and other municipal defendants based on the large numbers of arrests 
without probable cause.56 The parties settled. As a result of the settlement, the department essentially 
ended zero tolerance policing.57  
Regardless of the label attached to law enforcement methods—whether or not certain practices 
are defined as “zero tolerance policing”—Baltimore’s black residents are introduced and reintroduced to 
the criminal justice system in great numbers and remain cemented in it. In 2014, Blacks constituted 
slightly over eighty percent of total arrests in Baltimore, while nearly seventeen percent of arrests were of 
Whites.58 As these percentages dictate, Blacks also comprised the majority of arrests for specific crimes. 
For instance, Blacks made up ninety-two percent of arrests for loitering, seventy-nine percent of arrests 
for carrying an open container and nearly eighty-two percent of arrests for driving without a license, in 
contrast to White residents, who made up nearly eight percent of arrests for loitering and carrying an open 
container, and eleven percent of arrests for driving without a license.59 The racial disparities for marijuana 
offenses have been particularly dramatic. According to an American Civil Liberties Union study, in 2010, 
Blacks constituted ninety-two percent of those arrested in Baltimore for marijuana possession.60 During 
this same year, the arrest rate in Baltimore for marijuana possession was 1,136 per 100,000 residents, 
compared with Maryland overall, which had an arrest rate of 409 per 100,000 for this same charge.61  
 Thus, in both Ferguson and Baltimore, large numbers of Black residents have close, intimate, 
long-lasting, harmful and dangerous relationships with law enforcement. These relationships extend to the 
the rest of the criminal justice system, as Black residents overwhelmingly fill the dockets thatflood the 
courts in both jurisdictions.   
I. Stuck in the System: Warrants in Ferguson and Baltimore 
As easy as it is for Ferguson’s residents to enter the criminal justice system, it is even more 
difficult for them to exit and leave it behind. They remain stuck in it. This is especially the case with 
driving-related offenses, as Ferguson’s Black residents are arrested and convicted disproportionately—
                                                          
56 Amended Complaint, supra note 54.  
57 Stipulation of Settlement, Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches, et al., v. Baltimore City Police 
Department, et al., Civil Action No. 06-1863 (CCB) at 8 (“Within 30 days of the Effective Date of this Agreement, 
the Department shall issue a policy stating that the Department does not support a policy of Zero Tolerance 
Policing.”). In addition, prior to 2007, the walkthroughs were listed on criminal records maintained by law 
enforcement and it was incumbent upon individuals to file applications with the police department to remove the 
incidents from their records. In 2007, in large part because of the particular and disproportionate impact of 
walkthroughs on residents of Baltimore City, Maryland’s legislature enacted an automatic expungement provision, 
requiring that law enforcement commence the process necessary to expunge walkthroughs that occurred on or after 
October 1, 2007, within sixty days after release. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-103.1(b). However, individuals 
must still request expungment for walkthroughs that occurred prior to October 1, 2007. They have eight years to 
make the request. Id. at § 10-103(b). 
58 OpenBaltimore, https://data.baltimorecity.gov (last visited May 11, 2015) (containing statistical information about 
residents, businesses, and poilice activity in Baltimore, Maryland). 
59 Id. 
60 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON 
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 20 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf. 
61 Id. at 14–15. 
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and overwhelming—of these offenses.62 For many, these cases do not go away. They plead guilty to the 
offenses but cannot afford to pay the fines and related municipal court fees. The municipality has relied 
upon these court fees, fines and other costs as a substantial and lucrative funding stream, bringing in 
approximately $10 million dollars over the last five years.63 In 2013, these fees and fines constituted a 
staggering twenty percent of the municipality’s revenues.64 In Ferguson’s 2013–2014 budget, the 
projected revenues from “fines and public safety” exceeded the projected revenues from property taxes by 
nearly $500,000.65 The City Manager lauded the forty-four percent increase in municipal court revenues 
from FY 2010–2011, which was “[d]ue to a more concentrated focus on traffic enforcement.”66 
The financial burdens imposed by Ferguson’s criminal justice system and borne by defendants 
are akin to the broad swath of court and punishment-related fees that have resulted in “offender-funded 
justice.”67 These fees are used to help fund various municipal services, such as law enforcement and court 
functions, as well as to help support state budgets.68 However, these fees and costs, imposed on the 
poorest of the poor, result in debts that, in some jurisdictions, have been outsourced to private 
companies.69 In Ferguson, individuals have not appeared in court because they could not afford to pay the 
fines. They were scared of the legal consequences of their poverty.70 The courts then issued warrants for 
                                                          
62 For example, Ferguson’s police department has charged Blacks with speeding “at disproportionately high rates 
overall,” and the “disparate impact of [these] enforcement practices on [Blacks] is 48% larger when citations are 
issued not on the basis of radar or laser, but by some other method, such as the officer’s own visual assessment.” 
DOJ IINVESTIGATION, supra note 25, at 4-5. These issues are not specific to Ferguson, but rather reach 
municipalities throughout St. Louis County. See generally Rodney Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, 
Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty (exploring, in-depth, these driving-related 
offenses, the fines and fees related to these offenses that individuals cannot afford to pay, the extent to which 
municipalities rely on these fines and fees as revenue sources and the impact of the warrants). 
63 Complaint at 34, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). 
64 CITY OF FERGUSON, MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2014–15, at 50 (2014) (listing total 
revenues were $12,761,614 while “Fines and Public Safety” revenues amounted to $2,571,191), 
http://fergusoncity.com/documentcenter/view/1701.  
65 CITY OF FERGUSON, MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013–14, at 11 (2013), 
http://www.fergusoncity.com/DocumentCenter/View/1609.  
66 Id. at vi.  
67 E.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (2015), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf (“Many jails, courts 
and other criminal justice agencies charge for the services they provide, including jails that charge for clothing and 
laundry, room and board, medical care, rehabilitative programming, and even core functions such as booking.”). For 
descriptions of the various fees that are imposed through each phase of the criminal justice system, see generally 
Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175. 
68 E.g., ALICIA BANNON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4 (2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf (“Cash-strapped 
states have increasingly turned to user fees to fund their criminal justice systems, as well as to provide general 
budgetary support.”); REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE 
CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 29 
(2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf (“These 
criminal justice debts act to compound the collateral consequences of a criminal record and transform punishment 
from a temporary experience into a long-term, even lifelong status.”). 
69 See Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc.: Does the Alternatives-to-Incarceration Industry Profit From Injustice?, 
THE NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014 3, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc. 
70 E.g., DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 25, at 48 (discussing that “Ferguson court staff members told [DOJ 
investigators] that they believe the high number of missed court appearance in their court is attributable, in part, to 
[the] popular belief” that “if they cannot immediately pay the fines they owe, they will be arrested and sent to jail”); 
Julia Lurie & Katie Rose Quandt, How Many Ways Can the City of Ferguson Slap You with Court Fees? We 
Counted, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 12, 2014, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/ferguson-might-have-
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their failures to appear. The DOJ found that almost every warrant issued by Ferguson’s municipal court 
stemmed from “a person miss[ing] consecutive court appearances, or . . . a person miss[ing] a single 
required fine payment as part of a payment plan.”71 These warrants, as well as the unpaid fines and court 
fees, have kept the residents wedded to the criminal justice system in extraordinarily large numbers. In 
fiscal year 2013, Ferguson’s municipal court issued warrants to slightly more than 9,000 individuals for 
over 32,000 offenses.72 Thus, the number of warrants constituted nearly one-half of Ferguson’s 
population, including children and babies. During this same year, ninety-two percent of the arrest 
warrants were issued for Black defendants.73 As a result, many individuals and households in Ferguson, 
overwhelmingly Black, live in the shadows of the criminal justice system.  
These warrants extend relationships with the criminal justice system indefinitely. The DOJ found 
that “the primary role of warrants [in Ferguson] is not to protect public safety but rather to facilitate fine 
collection.”74 Thus, these warrants are not a law enforcement priority. They are simply a way to “coerce 
payment.”75 According to the DOJ, “[c]ourt staff report that they typically take weeks, if not months, to 
enter warrants into the system that enables patrol officers to determine if a person they encounter has an 
outstanding warrant.”76 Thus, the individuals—their bodies—are not “wanted” by law enforcement or the 
court; their money is. At times, however, when they do not have the money their bodies will do.77 
  Similarly, the relationships between Baltimore’s residents and the courts are often long-lasting. 
This is in part because court-issued warrants also keep thousands of residents connected to the criminal 
justice system, in varying degrees. These warrants stem from failures to appear in court. In 2014, Blacks 
constituted nearly seventy-eight percent of the 5,709 arrests for failing to appear in court, with Whites 
making up nearly twenty percent of these arrests.78  
 In addition, Baltimore’s poorest residents also live under the stress of various punishment-related 
fees, particularly parole fees. In 2009, the Brennan Center for Justice reported that the overwhelming 
majority of Baltimore’s formerly incarcerated individuals could not afford the then-$40 monthly parole 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
break-its-habit-hitting-poor-people-big-fines (“It’s a common misconception among Ferguson residents—especially 
those without attorneys—that if you show up without money to pay your fine, you’ll go to jail.”). 
71 DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 25, at 55. Relevant to missing court appearances, the DOJ found that defendants 
in Ferguson often have very little information about the offense charged, the fine amount “or whether a court 
appearance is required or some alternative method of payment is available.” Id. at 45. The DOJ “also found evidence 
that in issuing citations, [Ferguson police] officers frequently provide people with incorrect information about the 
date and time of their assigned court session.” Id. at 46. Moreover, an arrest warrant is issued “[i]f an individual 
misses a second court date, . . . without any confirmation that the individual received notice of that second court 
date.” Id. at 47. 
72 Id. at 55. 
73 Id. at 62. 
74 Id. at 56. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. This is not meant to suggest that individuals are not arrested in Ferguson on these warrants. Indeed, they are 
“with considerable frequency.” Id. Traffic stop data from the Ferguson Police Department reveal that from October 
2012 to October 2014, 460 individuals were arrested in Ferguson solely because of an arrest warrant, ninety-six 
percent of whom were Black. Id. at 57. 
77 Here, the DOJ concludes that “Ferguson’s practice of automatically treating a missed payment as a failure to 
appear—thus triggering an arrest and possible incarceration—is directly at odds with well-established law that 
prohibits ‘punishing a person for his poverty.’” Id. (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983)). Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has made clear the unconstitutionality of incarcerating an individual simply because of his or her 
poverty. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. In Bearden, the Court held that a person cannot be incarcerated solely because of 
the inability to pay a probation-required fine and restitution. Id. at 672–73. See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 
(1971) (holding that a person cannot be incarcerated solely because of inability to pay fines). 
78 BPD ARRESTS, https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/BPD-Arrests/3i3v-ibrt (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
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fee, particularly in light of other fees connected to parole, such as participation in various programs.79 
Debts that exceeded $30 at the end of parole term were “routinely” referred to the Central Collection Unit 
(CCU) of Maryland’s Department of Budget and management.80 The CCU, in turn, added collection costs 
to the outstanding debt.81 Ultimately, if the debt and subsequent costs were not collected, one of two 
things could or did happen: If the debt was less than $750, the CCU arranged to have state income tax 
refunds intercepted until it was paid.82 If the debt exceeded $750, Maryland’s Attorney General could file 
a civil action to secure a civil judgment, which could be enforced through wage garnishment and property 
liens, as well as end up on credit reports.83 
 The Brennan Center’s Report brought significant attention to the negative impact of these debts 
on parolees and helped lead to legislative changes in Maryland. While there were, and still are, possible 
exemptions from the parole fee, 84 individuals leaving prison were not informed.85 As a result of the 
legislative changes, individuals exiting detention must be given oral and written notice that sets forth the 
criteria that the Parole Commission may use in determining whether to exempt the fee.86 The exemption 
application process must also be explained to them.87  Despite these changes, individuals are wallowing 
in supervision-related debt. The “typical debts” that the CCU is responsible for collecting include those 
related to parole and probation “restitution,” supervisory fees and court costs accounts.88 In 2011, the 
parole and probation supervision fees were increased to $50 per month.89  
 While the parole and related fees in Baltimore are very different than the vast network of fees and 
fines that capture so many Ferguson residents, the results are often the same. People are scared, stressed, 
funneled through different systems and remain heavily indebted to those systems. Thus, they remain 
connected to the criminal justice system. They are stuck.   
 For the last five years, I have teamed with Sharon Cole, a long-serving, dedicated, client-
centered and community-focused attorney with the Maryland Office of the Public Defender, to conduct a 
presentation at Health Care for the Homeless, Inc. This is an organization headquartered in Baltimore that 
provides a wide range of services to underserved children and adults in several Maryland jurisdictions, 
including medical, mental health and housing-related services.90 Our presentation focuses on the 
interconnections between warrants and criminal record expungement. Approximately forty to fifty 
individuals attend each presentation, very much interested in and engaged with the issues that impact 
them, their families or their friends. Ms. Cole provides information about warrants including how a 
person can find out if he or she has a warrant, the steps to be taken to to deal with the warrant and the 
urgency of taking those steps. At each presentation she asks the audience how warrants interfere with 
their lives. Some of the most common answers are: Nobody will hire or rent an apartment to someone 
                                                          
79 REBEKAH DILLER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MARYLAND’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A BARRIER TO 
REENTRY 1 (2009), http://brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/MD.Fees.Fines.pdf. 
80 Id. at 19. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 20. 
84See MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-702 (d)(1)-(5) (West 2015) (lack of employment despite diligent attempts, 
school or vocational training enrollment, disability, support of dependents, or “other extenuating circumstances” 
could result in exemption, either in whole or in part). 
85 See DILLER ET AL.,supra note 79, at 1, 24-25.  
86 MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-702(j)(1). 
87 Id. at (j)(2).  
88 STATE OF MD., DEP’T. OF BUDGET & MGMT., STATEWIDE DEBT COLLECTION SERVICES, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 
(RFP) 27, SOLICITATION NO. F10B5400006 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/proc-
contracts/Documents/ProcurementsinProgress/DebtCollection2015Amend2.pdf.  
89 MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-702(b). 
90 HEALTH CARE FOR THE HOMELESS, INC., http://hchmd.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
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with a warrant. It is always attached to me. I can be arrested at any time. I have to always watch my 
back. It is stressful. It is paralyzing. Ms. Cole explains that these feelings and worries are common 
throughout the city because on any given day there are approximately 40,000 open warrants in 
Baltimore.91  
  Many warrants stretch back several years. Some individuals know about their warrants and live 
their lives on edge, not driving cars out of fear that a moving violation—one rolling stop—will result in 
arrest or constantly struggling because of the ways in which the warrants have interfered with housing, 
employment, mobility, freedom and peace of mind. Others, however, have absolutely no clue that a 
warrant is attached to their names. They have received no notice of the warrant and years, sometimes 
several, have passed with no contact from the court or police officers. They have no idea that they are still 
attached to the criminal justice system.    
II. POTENTIAL REFORMS—LESSONS FROM FERGUSON 
While the issues in Ferguson are vast and deeply rooted, the extent to which poor and working-
class Black men and women have financed the municipality through fines and court fees has received 
particular attention. Ferguson’s reliance on these fees and fines as funding mechanisms and its use of 
warrants as a gateway to incarcerate poverty—turning its jail into a “modern debtors prison”92—has 
sparked anger, shock, sadness and outrage among residents, concerned citizens near and far, stakeholders, 
and the bar. In response to some concerns, Ferguson’s lawmakers and municipal court put in place a 
number of measures specific to warrants and the fees. The court set a warrant recall period from 
September 15, 2014, to October 14, 2014, which allowed individuals to speak with a court clerk about 
having their warrants recalled.93 More than 600 hundred individuals reported to the court during this 
thirty-day period.94 Due to its success, the program has been extended indefinitely.95 The court also 
established a special docket for defendants struggling to make their monthly payments on fines.96 Also, 
lawmakers abolished the $50 warrant recall fee, eliminated the court fees previously imposed when 
defendants requested continuances, repealed the offense of failure to appear, and amended Ferguson’s 
fiscal year 2014–2015 budget to cap fines and fees derived from municipal ordinance violations at fifteen 
percent of the city’s revenue.97 Missouri’s legislature subsequently passed a bill to cap revenue from 
“fines, bond forfeitures and court costs for minor traffic violations” at 12.5% of general revenue of the 
municipalities that comprise St. Louis County (which includes Ferguson) and twenty percent for the 
                                                          
91 E.g., MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMB., S.B. 266 FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE 2 (2014), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014rs/fnotes/bil_0006/sb0266.pdf (“Baltimore City advises that the city currently has 
42,000 warrants.”).  
92 Complaint at 3, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). 
93 Aja J. Williams, Ferguson Warrant Recall Program Begins, KDSK.COM (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:03 AM), 
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/09/15/ferguson-warrant-recall-program/15690419/.  
94 Brett Blume, Ferguson Warrant-Recall Program Extended Indefinitely, CBS ST. LOUIS (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2014/10/13/ferguson-warrant-recall-program-extended-indefinitely/. 
95 Id. 
96 City of Ferguson, Monday Sept. 8 Statement: Ferguson City Council Announces New Programs to Reduce 
Community Concerns (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.fergusoncity.com/DocumentCenter/View/1735. 
97 See FERGUSON CITY COUNCIL, BILL NO. 7060, ORD. NO. 2014-3564 (2014) (enacted), http://mo-
ferguson2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/1723 (eliminating warrant fee and court continuances fees); 
FERGUSON CITY COUNCIL, BILL NO. 7062, ORD. NO. 2014-3566 (2014) (enacted), http://mo-
ferguson2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/1725 (repealing the offense of failure to appear in Municipal 
Court); FERGUSON CITY COUNCIL, BILL NO. 7061, ORD. NO. 2014-3565 (2014) (enacted), http://mo-
ferguson2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/1724. 
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remaining parts of Missouri.98 However, more substantial reforms may be forthcoming through 
investigation, litigation and oversight, the results of the DOJ’s findings as well as a class action lawsuit 
filed by individuals who have languished and suffered in Ferguson’s jails solely because of their inability 
to pay these fines and court related fees.99 
 There are lessons to be drawn from Ferguson with regard to warrants. The ideas related to 
designated warrant recall periods and dedicated warrant court parts are sound. The recall periods are 
similar to the federal “fugitive safe surrender” program, which is overseen by the U.S. Marshal’s 
Service.100 Through the program, jurisdictions around the country establish venues for individuals to 
return themselves on warrants for non-violent or misdemeanor offenses.101 Jurisdictions designate a time 
period, usually four days, during which individuals with warrants can return themselves to a designated 
neutral setting, such as a church. The surrender locations are staffed with judges, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, probation personnel, various service providers and, in some instances, clergy members.102 
Defendants have their matters heard at these locations. They have the opportunity to explain their 
circumstances and deal with the warrant and the underlying charge. Their voluntary return is deemed 
favorably and the vast majority of individuals who have surrendered in these fora were not arrested or 
sent to jail. A study of twenty-two safe surrender sites over a five year period found that slightly over two 
percent of the individuals who surrendered with an open warrant were arrested.103 
 While the surrender programs have yielded positive results they are confined to designated time 
periods that span a few days. They are also episodic. As a possible solution, all prosecutor offices should 
designate an attorney or team of attorneys to assume responsibility for the outstanding warrants in their 
particular jurisdiction. They would be tasked with taking steps to reduce the warrants by trying to resolve 
the underlying offenses. For instance, they would sift through the underlying cases to determine whether 
prosecution should continue or whether cases should be dismissed. They might decide that charges 
belonging to defendants who have had no subsequent interaction with the criminal justice system should 
be dismissed or they might determine that some charges can no longer be prosecuted given evidentiary 
weaknesses. Sorting the cases in these ways would allow prosecutors to separate strong cases from weak, 
to prioritize based on these assessments, and to get cases out of the system that no longer belong. 
 The Baltimore State’s Attorney took steps in this regard. A few years ago, the office designated 
an assistant state’s attorney to assume responsibility for the misdemeanor warrants cases. The assigned 
state’s attorney had a significant role in Baltimore’s Safe Surrender Program, weeding out cases prior to 
                                                          
98 S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. 8 (Mo. 2015), http://www.senate.mo.gov/15info/pdf-bill/tat/SB5.pdf. 
99 See Complaint at 1, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-253 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). A similar class action has 
also been filed against the City of Jennings, which neighbors Ferguson. See Complaint at 1, Jenkins v. City of 
Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 16989 (2012). 
101 Offices of the United States Attorneys, Fugitive Safe Surrender, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/violent-crime-prevention/fugitive-safe-surrender (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
102 E.g., N.J. Offers ‘Fugitive Safe Surrender’ Program to Those with Outstanding Warrants: Program Doesn’t 
Offer Amnesty, But Fugitive Will Get Favorable Consideration, CBS N.Y. (Nov. 6, 2013 10:00 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/11/06/n-j-offering-fugitive-safe-surrender-program-to-those-with-outstanding-
warrants/. 
103 DANIEL J. FLANNERY, WANTED ON WARRANTS: THE FUGITIVE SAFE SURRENDER PROGRAM 31–32 (2013). Mae 
Quinn, a Professor of Law at Washington University, formerly taught at the University of Tennessee College of 
Law. She represented clients in Knoxville who reported to amnesty events, which were focused on serving homeless 
individuals. She states that her clients frequently had their court-related debts forgiven at these events. E-mail from 
Mae Quinn, Professor of Law & Director, Juvenile Law & Justice Clinic (Mar. 4, 2015) (on file with author). 
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the surrender period that could no longer be prosecuted.104 However, the state’s attorney’s role extended 
past the program to the day-to-day responsibility of trying to resolve these cases. On several occasions 
students in the Reentry Clinic that I teach contacted the state’s attorney to advocate on behalf of clients 
whose warrants reached back several years. The goal was to resolve the underlying charge. The students 
conveyed our clients’ stories to the state’s attorney—why they desperately needed and deserved to move 
past the circumstances—and the cases were resolved in ways that allowed both the state’s attorney to 
shrink the pile of cases, albeit ever so slightly, and the clients to move forward with their lives. 
 In addition to the steps that Ferguson’s municipal court and City Council have taken with regard 
to warrant-related issues, the DOJ has recommended to the City of Ferguson several additional warrant-
specific reforms. It recommends that Ferguson “[c]ease practice of automatically issuing a warrant when 
a person on a payment plan misses a payment, and adopt procedures that provide for appropriate warnings 
following a missed payment.”105 It also recommends that the municipal court only jail individuals who 
failed to appear or failed to pay the penalty for a municipal code violation if a series of steps have been 
followed, among which are enforcing the fines through alternative means (such as community service and 
modifying payment plans) and providing attorneys to individuals prior to the warrant being issued.106 
Last, it recommends that the municipal court make permanent its temporary (albeit indefinitely extended) 
warrant recall program.107 
 The DOJ’s recommendations are necessary steps for Ferguson to take and for other jurisdictions 
to follow. Providing defense counsel to individuals as part of the warrant process (both prior to judges 
issuing the warrants and after they have done so) is critical to addressing and balancing the needs and 
concerns of courts, defendants, and communities. The sheer numbers of warrants in cities such as 
Ferguson and Baltimore prove them to be ineffective and overly punitive. Counsel is necessary to 
individualize their clients—their situations and circumstances—so that courts can make informed 
decisions about whether a warrant is necessary in a particular instance and, after the warrant has been 
issued, whether it should be recalled. Indeed, “under longstanding practice [in Ferguson] once an attorney 
makes an appearance in a case, the court automatically discharges any pending warrants.”108 This fact 
alone signifies the importance, and good fortune, of being represented by counsel in warrant-related 
matters. 
However, more can be done. Defender offices, members of the private bar and law school clinics 
can develop workshops and related materials that educate communities about warrants. They can also 
work together to organize workshops for individuals seeking legal advice related to their warrants. The 
attorneys and clinic students can instruct attendees on the steps necessary to resolve the warrant and 
provide legal representation to those who are interested. These workshops would be similar to others that 
defender offices, affiliated attorneys, and service providers hold on legal issues that directly impact 
individuals who have been through the criminal justice system, such as expungement workshops. 
 As in Ferguson, jurisdictions should repeal the offense of failure to appear. This offense and the 
related warrant are pasted on criminal records, which are easily accessible by employers, landlords and 
the general public. To employers and landlords, this charge connotes dishonesty, irresponsibility and 
evasion, labels that make it extraordinarily difficult to secure employment or housing. These labels and 
assumed character traits often run counter to the underlying narratives that lead to entry into the criminal 
                                                          
104 Jessica Anderson, Hundreds Take Advantage of Safe Surrender Program: Residents with Nonviolent Crimes had 
4 Days to Surrender, BALT. SUN (June 19, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-06-19/news/bs-md-safe-
surrender-20100619_1_deros-warrants-surrender. 
105 DOJ Investigation, supra note 25, at 99. 
106 Id. at 100. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 56. 
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justice system as well as the subsequent warrants. They tell stories that, in many circumstances, are 
simply not true. For many employers and landlords, the story begins and ends with the charge. The 
narrative and circumstances behind the charge are irrelevant. Thus, the charge should not be on the 
record. At the very least, it should come off the record once the warrant is resolved. Again, in many 
circumstances the warrants involve long-ago minor crimes. The long-lasting harms caused by failure to 
appear charges on criminal records far outlive the impact of the underlying charges. 
 Judges also have a significant role to play in reforming warrant-related practices. One of the 
searing impressions of Ferguson is the extent to which poor individuals are absolutely terrified of going to 
court because of their inability to pay fines and court-related fees. They are scared that their poverty will 
lead to their incarceration; in essence, that their inability to pay these costs is a crime unto itself. 
Frightened at the prospect of going to jail, they do not show up to court and the municipal judge issues the 
warrants. In addition to the DOJ’s recommendations regarding the information that needs to be conveyed 
to individuals regarding fines, fees and warrants, judges need to explain to all individuals, orally and in 
writing, that their inability to pay fines and court-related fees cannot and will not be the basis of a 
subsequent arrest or incarceration. 
 Last, key stakeholders—judges, prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, elected officials, and 
advocates—need to hear directly from the scores of individuals whose warrants keep them in the shadows 
of the criminal justice system. The DOJ did just that and its report is filled with stories of individuals who 
have suffered at each stage of Ferguson’s criminal justice system, including those burdened with 
warrants. Any attempts at instituting warrant-related reforms would be lacking without listening to, 
considering and incorporating the stories and experiences of indivdiuals who have been through the 
criminal justice system, including the the circumstances that led to their warrants and the impact the 
warrants have had on their lives. Their stories and experiences are primary sources for stakeholders to 
understand and consider. Their input and ideas are integral to the warrant-related reforms that are 
necessary to balance the needs of law enforcement, courts, defendants, families and communities. 
EPILOGUE 
I wrote this essay in early 2015, with the goal of drawing some similarities between the criminal 
justice systems of Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland. My aims were to illustrate that relatively 
minor crimes drive these respective systems and to explain the ways that court warrants keep individuals, 
overwhelmingly poor and Black, attached to these systems. 
 However, deep into the editing process, Freddie Gray died. A twenty-five year old lifelong 
resident of Baltimore, Mr. Gray died one week after police officers encountered him “alive and 
walking,”109 chased, detained, searched, arrested, dragged and bound him, put him in a police van and 
drove him without safety belts through parts of Baltimore City, making multiple stops along the way to 
the Western Police District. According to the States Attorney of Baltimore City—who criminally charged 
the six officers involved in this incident—Mr. Gray requested and begged for medical attention, first 
when the arresting officers placed him in handcuffs and then throughout this ride, as he stated multiple 
times that he could not breathe.110 At one stop, the State’s Attorney alleges, Mr. Gray was 
unresponsive.111 When the officers arrived at the Western Police District, “Mr. Gray was no longer 
breathing at all.”112 Paramedics subsequently arrived, determined that Mr. Gray was in cardiac arrest113 
                                                          
109 Paul Butler, The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights Creates a Double Standard, NY TIMES, Apr. 29, 2015.  
110 Application for Statement of Charges, Edward Michael Nero, Defendant, District Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City, May 1, 2015 (Officer Nero is one of the six officers charged).  
111 Id.  
112 Id. 
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and transported him to University of Maryland Shock Trauma, where he underwent two spinal surgeries, 
remained comatose and died one week later, with a nearly severed spine and a broken voice box.  
The arresting officers claimed that they chased Mr. Gray because he “fled unprovoked” upon 
“noticing police presence.”114 Nothing else.115 They alleged that upon apprehending Mr. Gray one of the 
officers “noticed a knife clipped to the inside of his front pants pocket.”116 They stated that they “arrested 
him without force or incident,”117 although video recordings show a screaming Freddie Gray being 
dragged in the street and into the back of a police van, his legs seemingly not functioning. He was 
charged with possessing a switch blade, a non-violent misdemeanor offense.118 His death precluded him 
from challenging the initial encounter with the officers, the chase, the seizure, the search, the arrest and, 
indeed, the lawfulness of the knife.  
Mr. Gray’s tragic death made the similarities between Ferguson and Baltimore even more stark 
and distressing. As with Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Mr. Gray’s death angered and saddened 
Baltimore’s residents, particularly those who live in the city’s Black communities, where poverty is 
concentrated and generations of residents have relationships with Baltimore’s Police Department and its 
criminal justice system that are marked by abuse, frustration, fear, disgust, anger, routine, and familiarity. 
In the aftermath of Mr. Gray’s death, the United States Department of Justice opened a pattern or practice 
investigation into Baltimore’s Police Department that “will seek to determine whether there are systemic 
violations of the Constitution or federal law by officers of BPD.”119 Specifically, “[t]he investigation will 
focus on BPD’s use of force, including deadly force, and its stops, searches and arrests, as well as whether 
there is a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing.”120  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
113 Id.  
114 Application for Statement of Charges, Freddie Carlos Grey [sic] Jr., Defendant, District Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City, Apr. 12, 2015.  
115 Many commentators have asserted that the chase preceding Mr. Gray’s arrest was lawful, relying on the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois v. Wardlow that unprovoked flight in a drug-prone neighborhood gives 
rise to reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, stated that a person’s “unprovoked” flight from police officers in a “high crime” area, while “not necessarily 
indicative of wrongdoing, . . . is certainly suggestive of such.” Id. at 124. However, Justice Stevens, who concurred 
and dissented in part from Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, explained that “[a]mong some citizens, particularly 
minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is . . . the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely 
innocent, but with or without justification, believes that contact with the police itself can be dangerous. . . .” Id. at 
132. He continued, “these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law 
enforcement investigations into their own practices.” Id. at 133. Following Wardlow, Maryland’s Court of Special 
Appeals also held that flight in a drug-prone neighborhood “justified the police chase and . . . subsequent detention.” 
Wise v. State, 751 A.2d 24, 27 (Md. App. 2000). However, of particular note, in both Wardlow and Wise the officers 
alleged that they saw something else other than “unprovoked” flight. In Wardlow, the officers asserted that Mr. 
Wardlow was “standing next to [a] building holding an opaque bag” in a drug-prone location. Illinois v. Wardlow at 
121-22. He then ran upon seeing the officers. In Wise, the officer alleged that he saw Mr. Wise “walk into an alley in 
a neighborhood known for its drug dealing.” Wise v. State, at 132. He then saw Mr. Wise “balling up a brown paper 
bag and placing it under a telephone book in a grassy area in the alley.” Id. Mr. Wise then made eye contact with the 
officer and ran. Id. In stark contrast, the officers who chased and arrested Mr. Gray did not allege that they saw him 
do anything or hold anything before or at the time they made eye contact. He simply ran. 
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Poor, Black and “Wanted” 
The events that transpired in Ferguson and Baltimore immediately after these tragedies put both 
cities on national and international display. The world has learned, through these tragic deaths, of the 
conditions and circumstances that have deteriorated police-community relations in communities of color, 
of criminal justice systems that capture, stigmatize, and paralyze Black men, women and children, and of 
episodes of police violence that capstoned decades of indignity, frustration, marginalizion, 
criminalization, and force. The world—including communities in other parts of the cities, counties, and 
states where these incidents have occurred—has also been exposed to the array of other issues and 
conditions that plague poor communities of color and connect both to police-community relationships and 
contact with the criminal justice system: concentrated poverty, joblessness, economic inequality, 
inadequate education, lack of meaningful opportunities, inadequate healthcare, food deserts, redlining, 
subprime mortgages, vacant homes, and lower life expectancy, among other issues. Also, through these 
tragedies, the calls for law enforcement transparency and accountability have become louder, with ideas 
such as body cameras, placing officers on foot patrol and in other ways integrating officers into the 
communities they patrol becoming part of the national discourse. 
 This essay, in the context of these issues, is quite narrow. Indeed, the range of issues that has 
surfaced recently in response to the unarmed Black men, women and children who have been killed by 
police officers or died in police custody is vast and deep. In particular, the deaths of Michael Brown and 
Freddie Gray have exposed to the world the circumstances and conditions—historical, decades-long and 
current—that have impacted all aspects of life for individuals, families, and communities within Ferguson 
and Baltimore. These issues are as present today as ever. While the criminal justice system is a focal point 
in both cities, the issues are much broader. Thus, holistic reform—reform that addresses the broad swath 
of circumstances and conditions that lead to over-involvement with the criminal justice system—must be 
the overarching goal.  
 Hopefully, this essay offers a couple of ways to move forward and contributes to the efforts 
currently undertaken by communities, individuals, and families who have been impacted by police 
violence and the criminal justice system, clergy, activitists, advocates, law enforcement leaders, scholars 
and lawmakers. As always, these are urgent times.  
 
  
